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1. Introduction
Academics and practitioners have known for long that in the absence of tight monitoring,
CEOs of large publicly held firms may take actions that are detrimental to their shareholders.
To set up counter-powers to the CEO, the consensus has been to rely on a strong board of
directors, independent from the management. The academic literature confirms that board
independence improves governance.1 Yet, there is no evidence that board independence
affects the profitability or even the value of corporate assets.2
This paper proposes a new, easily implementable, measure of governance based on the
degree of independence of the CEO’s immediate subordinates. It shows that, unlike board
independence, subordinates’ independence is a strong predictor of performance in US data.
From the earlier governance literature, we retain the insight that independence matters,
but shift the focus to the executive suite. After all, CEOs have to face their subordinates
on a daily basis, whereas boards of directors only meet a few times every year. In order
to capture top executives’ independence from the CEO, we compute the fraction of top
ranking executives who joined the firm before the current CEO was appointed. As CEOs
are typically involved in the recruiting of their subordinates, executives hired during their
tenure are more likely to share the same preferences and/or have an incentive to return the
favor. Similarly, executives who have experienced the leadership of previous CEOs are more
likely to challenge the current management.
We first provide evidence on corporate performance: we find that high internal gover-
nance (high fraction of independent executives) predicts high future performance, measured
through accounting ratios or market valuation. Conversely, poor performance does not lead
to a decrease in internal governance, suggesting a causal effect of internal governance on
performance. Our findings are not affected when we control for traditional, mostly board-
1Independent boards of directors seem to pay more attention to corporate performance when it comes to
CEO turnover or compensation (Weisbach, 1988; Dahya et al., 2002). The stock market hails the appointment
of independent directors with abnormal returns (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990).
2In fact, the correlation is negative. A likely reason for this is that poorly performing firms tend to
appoint more outside directors (Kaplan and Minton, 1994).
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based, corporate governance measures. We also show that our results are not driven by the
departure of executives ”leaving a sinking boat”, i.e. quitting due to the anticipation of the
firm’s future decline.
We then look at the impact of internal governance on the quality of decision making.
To do this, we focus on acquisitions, which are large investment projects with measurable
value effects. We show that a lower fraction of independent executives is associated with
significantly lower returns for the acquirer’s shareholders. By contrast, regular indices of
external governance are not correlated with the long-term shareholders’ losses made after
an acquisition. The board of director, takeover pressure or the design of corporate charters
seem less efficient at preventing bad/expensive acquisitions from happening.
These empirical results echo the theory we develop in a companion paper (Landier et
al., 2009), where we show that dissent in the chain of command may, in some cases, be
good for the quality of decision-making.3 In our model, a decision-maker chooses between
two projects, but has a preference (bias) for one of them. The decision maker also receives
objective information (a signal) about which project is most likely to succeed. Successful
completion of the project also requires effort from subordinates. Subordinates may have a
preference for the same project as the CEO (monolithic chain of command) or for the other
project (dissent). We show that dissenting subordinates can be useful because they force the
decision-maker to internalize their motivation. If he wants the project to succeed, he needs
to give in less to his bias. Subordinates know this and expect the order to be more objective:
they make more effort as a result. Overall better, more objective, decisions are made. As a
by-product of our theoretical analysis, we also show that dissent is more likely to be optimal
when product market uncertainty is high. We provide some evidence consistent with this
prediction in this paper.
At a more general level, we believe an important contribution of our paper is to exhibit
an organizational firm-level variable with strong systematic predictive power on future per-
3See also Acharya et al. (2011) for a related analysis.
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formance. Our internal governance variable might simply capture the extent of CEO power
over the firm: “powerful CEOs” might be both prone to do inefficient acquisitions and to
replace executives with their own friends with no link between the two. The novelty of this
measure is, however, that it is the first one to exhibit a robust correlation with corporate
performance. In this respect, it does better than traditional measures of ”CEO power” such
as whether the CEO is chairman of the board, or whether many directors are insiders. As it
turns out, internal governance as we measure it exhibits no correlation at all with standard
“external” governance measures.
Our study may have two normative implications for practitioners dealing with corporate
governance. First, our statistical analysis indicates that the intensity of internal governance
can be at least partly observed and could be included in the various measures of the quality of
a firm’s corporate governance. This implication does not depend on a specific interpretation
of our results: be it the sign of a ”non-autocratic” CEO, or of the healthy discipline of
having to convince one’s subordinates, the share of independent executives as we measure
it does predict performance. A second implication hinges on our “bottom-up governance”
interpretation: in addition to management monitoring and advising, a key role of the board
should also consist in designing the optimal balance of power within the firm. Put differently,
the human resource role of the board is not limited to the usually emphasized CEO succession
problem, but extends to the rest of the executive suite. Such a role could be particularly
important in industries where the management of extreme risk is important, like the financial
industry. For instance, Ellul and Yerramilli (2010) show that banks with more independent
risk managers (i.e. well paid relative to the CEO) have done better during the 2007-2008
financial crisis.
The paper has five more sections. Section 2 describes the datasets we use and how we
construct our index of internal governance. Section 3 looks at the relationship between
internal governance and corporate performance. Section 4 looks at the costs of acquisitions.
Section 5 discusses the relation between our internal governance index and usual corporate
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governance measures. Section 6 concludes on theoretical questions raised by our findings.
2. Data and Measurement Issues
We first describe the datasets we use to conduct our study. We then discuss the construction
of our measures of internal governance.
2.1 DATASETS
We use five datasets. EXECUCOMP provides us with the firm-level organizational variables
with which we proxy for internal governance. COMPUSTAT provides us with firm-level
accounting information. IRRC’s corporate governance and director data allows us to obtain
standard measures of external corporate governance. Acquisitions are drawn from SDC
Platinum, and stock returns from CRSP.
2.1.1 Internal Governance
The first data set is the EXECUCOMP panel of the five best paid executives of the largest
American corporations. We use this data source to measure the extent of “internal gover-
nance” in the firm. We do this by computing the fraction of executives hired after the CEO
took office (i.e. the fraction of non-independent executives). Thus, internal governance is
said to be poor when this fraction is high.
Initially, each observation is an executive (or the CEO) in a given firm in a given year.
Our sample period is from 1992 to 2009. In the raw dataset, there are 195,890 observations,
which correspond to approximately 1,850 firms per year (33,375 firm-years) with an average
of six executives each (including the CEO). 4,142 firm-year observations have no CEO (using
the CEOANN dummy variable indicating which executive is the CEO). In some cases, it is
possible to infer the CEO’s identity because, for one of the executives, the BECAMECEO
variable (date at which the executive became CEO) is available, even though the CEOANN
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dummy is missing (misleadingly indicating that the executive is not the CEO). By filling
in these gaps, we save an additional 3,053 firm year observations, and end up with 32,286
firm-years for which we know the identity of the CEO (a total of 190,869 observations in the
executive-firm-year dataset).
To compute the fraction of non-independent executives, we will need to compare the
CEO’s tenure to the executives’ seniorities within the company. A first approach is to rely
on the seniority (within the firm) and tenure (within the position) variables reported in
EXECUCOMP. The BECAMECEO variable gives us, for the current CEO, the precise date
at which he (she) was appointed as CEO whether he (she) was hired from inside or outside the
firm. Other executives’ seniorities can be recovered using the JOINED CO variable, which
reports the date at which the executive actually joined the firm. Focusing on observations for
which both BECAMECEO and JOINED CO are non-missing for at least one executive, we
lose more than half of the sample, and end up with 14,907 firm-years, from 1992 to 2009,
for which we can now compute the fraction of executives hired after the current CEO’s
appointment. We call this measure of executive dependence FRAC1.
Overall, we lose 32,286-14,907=17,379 firm-year observations in the process of construct-
ing our measure of internal governance, mostly because many executives do not report their
seniority within the firm. In 7,022 of our remaining 14,907 firm-years, internal governance
is measured by comparing the CEO’s tenure with the seniority of only one executive. This
means that FRAC1 will be a very noisy measure of executive dependence; while this does
not create an obviously spurious correlation with corporate performance or returns to acqui-
sitions, it is going to bias our estimates of the effect of internal governance downwards, as
measurement error often does.
A second approach is to make direct use of the fact that we can follow individuals in
the EXECUCOMP panel. To remove left censorship (the panel starts in 1992), we need to
restrict ourselves to firms where we observe at least one episode of CEO turnover. Once the
new CEO has been appointed at a given firm, we can compute the fraction of executives
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that were not listed in the dataset as employees of that firmbefore the new CEO started
(we name this alternative variable FRAC2). The main advantage of this approach is that
we can dispense of the JOINED CO variable, which is often missing. The need to observe
CEO turnover restricts the number of firm-years to 16,219. This is more that the 14,907
observations available to compute FRAC1. However, focusing on firms with at least one
CEO turnover over the course of eighteen years may mechanically overweight firms facing
governance problems. Moreover, executives enter the panel when they either (1) are hired by
the firm, (2) make it into the five best paid people list, or (3) the firm decides to report their
pay in its annual report/proxy. Hence, entry in the panel provides only a noisy measure of
seniority.
In spite of its shortcomings, the second (panel based) variable FRAC2 has a correlation
coefficient of 0.47 with the first (seniority based) variable FRAC1. We present our results
with both FRAC1 and FRAC2.
We also use EXECUCOMP to construct CEO and executives characteristics to be in-
cluded as controls in our regressions: (1) CEO seniority, which is the number of years since
the executive has been appointed as the CEO (using BECAMECEO variable); (2) a dummy
which equals one if the CEO comes from outside the firm – i.e., if the BECAMECEO vari-
able coincides with the JOINED CO variable or when at least one of the two variables is
missing, if the first year of presence of the executive in the EXECUCOMP database has
been as CEO of the firm; (3) executive’s seniority which is the average number of years since
executives have been working for the company (using JOINED CO variable or entry in the
EXECUCOMP database); (4) the fraction of executives appointed within one year of the
CEO nomination – i.e., in the year of the CEO nomination or the next one; (5) the firm-level
fraction of executives whose seniority is reported – i.e., for which the JOINED CO variable is




For each firm-year observation in our EXECUCOMP sample, we retrieve firm level account-
ing information from COMPUSTAT; we match by GVKEY identifier. We compute profitabil-
ity as return on assets (ROA).4 We construct Market to book as the ratio of the firm’s assets
market value to their book value, as in Gompers et al. (2003).5 In robustness checks, we use
return on equity (ROE) and Net margin as alternative measures of performance.6 We proxy
firm size by taking the logarithm of total assets. We proxy firm age by taking the logarithm
of one plus the number of years since the firm has been in the COMPUSTAT database. In
robustness checks, we also proxy firm age by taking the logarithm of one plus the number
of years since the firm has been in the CRSP database. We construct the 48 Fama-French
industry dummies using the firm’s 4 digit SIC industry code.7 We also include the number of
business segments – obtained from the COMPUSTAT segment files – and cash-flow volatility
in our regressions. Cash-flow volatility is defined as in Zhang (2006). Variable definitions are
presented in detail in the Appendix. Table I presents summary statistics on our measures
of executive dependence and CEO, executives and firm characteristics. Finally, we trim our
measures of performance (ROA, Market to book, ROE and Net margin) at the 1% and 99%
levels.
2.1.3 External Governance
We will also look at how our measures of internal governance correlate with traditional cor-
porate governance measures. Thus, for each firm-year observation, we gather information on
corporate governance from IRRC’s corporate governance and directors dataset. This dataset
4Return on assets is operating income before depreciation (item OIBDP) minus depreciation and amor-
tization (item DP) over total assets (item AT).
5Market to book is the ratio of market to book value of assets (item AT). The market value is computed
as total assets (item AT) plus the number of common shares outstanding (item CSHO) times share price
at the end of the fiscal year (item PRCC) minus common equity (item CEQ) minus deferred taxes (item
TXDB).
6ROE is net income (item NI) over common equity. Net margin is net income over sales (item SALE).
7For this, we use the conversion table in the Appendix of Fama and French (1997).
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provides us with commonly used proxies for corporate governance, namely, the fraction of
independent directors, the number of directors sitting on the board and the fraction of for-
mer employees sitting on the board. These variables are available for the 1996-2001 period
only, and mostly for large firms. Out of 23,670 firm-year observations where we can mea-
sure internal governance (either through FRAC1 or FRAC2), only 5,722 observations have
information from IRRC.
We will also look at the Gompers et al. (2003) index of corporate governance (GIM index),
which compiles various corporate governance provisions included in the CEO’s compensation
package, in the corporate charter and the board structure. The GIM index is available for
1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006. In other years, we assume that it takes
the value that it had in the most recent year where it was non missing.
2.1.4 Acquisitions
We obtain the list of firms who made significant acquisitions from SDC Platinium (deals of
value larger than $ 10 million). SDC provides us with the bidder’s CUSIP and the transaction
value of the deal. We focus on completed deals where the bidder bought at least 50% of the
target’s shares.
For each firm-year observation in our EXECUCOMP sample, we compute the number of
targets acquired during that year and the overall amount spent on the deal(s). In our base
sample of 23,670 firm-years where at least one measure of internal governance is available,
34% of the observations correspond to firms making at least one acquisition (with value
larger than $ 10 million): 1997 to 2000 are the peak years, with more than 37% of firms
making at least one acquisition. 57% of the acquirers make only one deal per year, but there
are a few serial acquirers (three percent of the observations correspond to at least five deals
carried out during the year).
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2.1.5 Stock Returns
To see whether having more ”independent” top ranking executives in a firm induces better
strategic decisions by the CEO, we focus on the effect of internal governance on the firm’s
acquisitions’ performance. We restrict ourselves to large acquisitions (whose value exceeds
$300 million) and we compute for each deal, long run abnormal stock returns following the
acquisition.
We merge the above SDC extract with our base sample from EXECUCOMP. We end up
with a list of 1,813 deals for which we know the acquirer, the date of the acquisition, and
either FRAC1 or FRAC2 (the share of executives appointed after the CEO took office).
Serial acquirers are overrepresented. Out of 1,813 deals, 372 involve one time buyers, while
947 involve firms carrying out at least four large deals. Overall, our sample features 717
different acquirers.
We then match this deal dataset with the acquirer’s stock returns as provided by CRSP.
More precisely, we retrieve monthly acquirer stock returns from a period extending 48 months
prior to each acquisition to 48 months after the deal. We remove deals with less that 48
months of acquirer returns history before the acquisition. This reduces our sample size to
1,334 deals. We then estimate a four factor Fama-French model for each acquirer using
the 48 pre-acquisition months available. We use the returns of the MKTRF, SMB, HML
and UMD portfolios from Kenneth French’s web site. We then use this model to compute
abnormal returns both before and after the deal.
2.2 INTERNAL GOVERNANCE ANDCEO/EXECUTIVES CHAR-
ACTERISTICS
The assumption underlying the internal governance measures is that the CEO is directly
or indirectly involved in the recruitment process of top executives. Hence, executives ap-
pointed during his tenure are more likely to be loyal to him and/or share his preferences
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than executives who were picked by a predecessor.
However, one needs to be careful with the CEO or executives characteristics that are likely
to be correlated with FRAC1 or FRAC2 and to independently affect firm performance. As a
CEO’s seniority increases, a larger fraction of executives have (mechanically) been appointed
during his tenure. Conversely, executives who have been with the firm longer are on average
more likely to have been hired before the current CEO. This suggests that FRAC1 and
FRAC2 are positively correlated with CEO tenure, and negatively correlated with executive
seniority. Also, externally appointed CEOs often have the mandate to arrange a shake-out
of the executive suite. Hence, FRAC1 and FRAC2 should be mechanically larger in the
presence of outsider CEOs. Finally, a new CEO’s appointment is sometimes followed by
immediate waves of executive departures and arrivals that might be unrelated to internal
governance (for example, top executives who were hopeful of being appointed at the top job
might leave the firm).
It might be tempting to see these sources of variation in the proportion of aligned ex-
ecutives as exogenous shocks to internal governance, but they might be related to firm
performance for reasons orthogonal to internal governance. For example, CEO tenure may
directly affect corporate performance simply because experience on the job matters. Also,
if the firm is in really bad shape, a new CEO will have to inject more “fresh blood” into
the corporate suite (Hayes et al., 2005), which mechanically increases executive turnover.
We therefore include as controls in our performance regressions these CEO and executives
characteristics alongside with either FRAC1 or FRAC2.
To observe the strength of these mechanical correlations, we first regress our measures of
internal governance, FRAC1 and FRAC2, on CEO and executives characteristics in order
to investigate how they correlate. We estimate:
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FRAC1it = α1 + α2 ∗ CEOTENit + α3 ∗ EXECSENit + α4 ∗OUTSIDEit
+α5 ∗KNOWNit + α6 ∗ FRAC1 1Yit + (Firm controls)it + εit (1)
FRAC2it = β1 + β2 ∗ CEOTENit + β3 ∗ EXECSENit + β4 ∗OUTSIDEit
+β5 ∗ FRAC2 1Yit + (Firm controls)it + εit (2)
where, for firm i in year t, CEOTENit stands for CEO’s tenure, EXECSENit for average
executive seniority within the firm, OUTSIDEit is a dummy indicating whether the CEO
comes from outside the firm, KNOWNit is the fraction of executives for which seniority
is reported in the data, FRAC1 1Yit and FRAC2 1Yit are the fraction of executives that
arrived within a year of the CEO’s nomination. We also add firm level controls: firm size,
firm age, the number of business segments and cash-flow volatility. We include cash-flow
volatility to control for the fact that performance variation may trigger turnover of top
executives. Finally, we include in our regressions year fixed effects and either industry or
firm fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the firm level to account for serial correlation
of the error term within the same firm. It is important to notice that high values of FRAC1
or FRAC2 mean poor internal governance (consistently with the convention adopted by the
Gompers et al. (2003) external governance index).
The regression results are reported in Table II. Columns 1 to 3 (respectively columns 4 to
6) present the results when internal governance is FRAC1 (respectively FRAC2). Columns
1 and 4 include only year dummies and the CEO/Executives characteristics as independent
variables. When internal governance is FRAC1, we also include the fraction of executives
for which seniority is actually reported in EXECUCOMP (KNOWN , which we include to
control for potential selection biases). Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 add the firm level controls.
Columns 2 and 5 include industry fixed effects, whereas columns 3 and 6 include firm fixed
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effects.
The empirical correlations between the CEO/Executives characteristics and either FRAC1
or FRAC2 turn out to have the expected sign. FRAC1 and FRAC2 are positively and
strongly correlated with CEO tenure and negatively correlated with executive tenure. They
are also positively associated with the presence of outside CEOs, although the relation is
significant only in the specifications of columns 1 and 2. There are at least two possible
interpretations for this. First, outside CEOs are often given a mandate to reshuffle top man-
agement, and as a result the fraction of executives who joined the company with them is
large. Second, the appointment of outside CEOs triggers the departure of talented executives
who were hoping to get the top job. Another possibility could simply be that management
shake-ups tend to happen when the firm is doing badly, which may also generate departures.
Notice also that FRAC1 is positively correlated with the fraction of executives whose senior-
ity is reported: Hence, more “transparent” firms tend to have executives appointed after the
CEO. Finally, firm-level variables are not strongly correlated with our measures of internal
governance, except for firm age that is negatively and strongly correlated with FRAC1 (but
not with FRAC2).
Last, one possible concern is that FRAC1 and FRAC2 might be correlated with in-
tense merger activity in the past. After mergers, top executives from the targets often join
the executive suite, mechanically increasing our indexes. And, if the firm still has trouble
“digesting” its past acquisitions, it is likely to underperform on both accounting and stock
price measures. The insignificant correlation between the number of business segments and
FRAC1 or FRAC2 already partially alleviates this concern. To further address this point,
we correlated FRAC1 and FRAC2 with the number of past acquisitions for a cross section
of firms in 2000. We found no evidence that high FRAC1 or FRAC2 firms had bought a
particularly large number of firms in the 1990s. This is robust to various controls and to the
year chosen. Our indexes are thus not proxies for M&A “indigestion.”
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3. Internal Governance and Corporate Performance
Figure 1 provides a first look at the relationship between internal governance and corporate
performance. We first filter out the mechanical effects of CEO/Executives characteristics
from FRAC1 and FRAC2 by taking the residuals of regressions (1) and (4) in Table II.
We then split the sample distribution of the residuals into five quintiles, and we compute
for each quintile the mean industry adjusted performance8, as well as the 95% confidence
band assuming normality. Performance is measured through ROA (left panels) and Market
to book (right panels). Figure 1 shows a positive and statistically significant association
between good internal governance (low values of the residuals) and corporate performance.
3.1 BASIC RESULTS
We now move to the multivariate analysis. We run the following regression:
Yit = α + β ∗ IGit−1 + (IG controls)it + (Firm controls)it + εit (3)
where Yit measures corporate performance (ROA, Market to book). IGit−1 is our measures
of internal governance (either FRAC1 or FRAC2), lagged one period.9 We use the same
control variables as in Equations (1) and (2). As already mentioned, we include the CEO
and executives characteristics (IG controls) since it may be argued that they directly affect
corporate performance (CEO tenure, mean executive seniority, share of executive hired right
after the CEO, a dummy indicating if the CEO is an insider or not). When internal gover-
nance is FRAC1, we also include the fraction of executives for which seniority is reported
in the data. Because FRAC1 and FRAC2 are strongly persistent, it is likely that the εit
are not independent from different observations of the same firm i. We therefore cluster
standard errors at the firm level to account for serial correlation of the error term within the
8We used the Fama-French 48 industries.
9We seek to partially avoid obvious simultaneity biases, such as the ones we discuss below. We obtain
similar results if our measures of internal governance are lagged two periods.
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same firm.
Table III presents the results when performance is measured through ROA. Columns 1
and 2 use FRAC1 as measure of internal governance whereas columns 3 and 4 use FRAC2.
Columns 1 and 3 report regression results with year and industry fixed effects, whereas
columns 2 and 4 report results with year and firm fixed effects. With industry fixed effects,
an increase in either FRAC1 or FRAC2 is negatively and significantly (at the 1% level)
associated with a drop in ROA. As for the economic significance of our findings, a one-
standard deviation increase in FRAC1 is associated with a decrease of about 0.8 ROA
percentage points (3.28 ∗ 0.245); a one-standard deviation increase in FRAC2 is associated
with a decrease of about 0.5 ROA percentage points. The explanatory power of this effect
is not very large (9% of one standard deviation of ROA in the case of FRAC1 and 6% in
the case of FRAC2), but, as we will see, it is consistently significant contrary to some of
the usual “external” corporate governance measures. Also, the small size of our coefficients
is not surprising given the noise of our internal governance measures (see section 2.1.1).
Our results are robust to the introduction of firm fixed effects when internal governance
is measured with FRAC2. When internal governance is FRAC1, the coefficient remains
negative but it is not significant when Equation (3) is run with firm fixed effects.
Table IV presents the results when performance is measured through Market to book.
With industry fixed effects, an increase in FRAC1 or FRAC2 is associated with a lower
Market to book. However, this relation is not significant in the case of FRAC1. As for
the economic significance of our findings, a one-standard deviation increase in FRAC1 or
FRAC2 is associated with a decrease in Market to book of about 5 percentage points.
Again, the explanatory power of the effect is small (3% of one standard deviation of Market
to book). Finally, our results are again robust to the introduction of firm fixed effects when
internal governance is measured with FRAC2.
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3.2 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND CAUSALITY
Table V presents robustness checks. Rows 1 to 3 (respectively rows 4 to 6) report regression
results from variants of Equation (3), measuring performance by ROA (respectively Market
to book). In rows 1 and 4, we proxy firm age with the number of years since the firm
has been in CRSP instead of COMPUSTAT. In rows 2 and 5, we replace the number of
business segments by a diversification dummy which equals 1 if the firm reports more than
one business segment, and 0 otherwise. In rows 3 and 6, we include the square of all control
variables as additional controls to check whether our results are not driven by the fact that
FRAC1 and FRAC2 are correlated with some CEO and executives characteristics in a
non-linear way. In all specifications, the results are similar to those in Tables III and IV.
Finally, in rows 7 and 8, we re-estimate the specification of Equation (3) except that the
dependent variable is Net margin and ROE. The coefficients on FRAC1 and FRAC2 are
always negative. Moreover, for FRAC2, the coefficients are significant with both industry
(column 3) and firm fixed effects (column 4).
In the Appendix (Table A-I), we report results for year-by-year cross-sectional regressions.
We also report Fama-MacBeth estimates. For both FRAC1 and FRAC2 and for both
measures of performance (ROA and Market to book), the Fama-MacBeth estimate is negative
and significant.10
There are several economic mechanisms consistent with the relation between our measures
of internal governance and performance found in Tables III and IV. Our favored interpre-
tation is that strong internal governance is a way for shareholders to “hold the CEO on a
tight leash” and prevent the CEO from undertaking negative Net Present Value projects or
indulging in inefficient empire building. One could argue, however, that the causality runs
in the opposite direction: declining performance may actually trigger an increase in FRAC1
10When internal governance is FRAC1, we exclude the years 2007, 2008 and 2009 because the JOINED CO
variable is very rarely reported from 2007 onwards. When internal governance is FRAC2, we exclude the
years 1993 and 1994. For these years, by construction, the correlation between FRAC2 and the fraction of
executives appointed within a year of the CEO’s nomination is close to one.
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or FRAC2 (i.e. a drop in our internal governance quality measures). One plausible story
could be based on management turnover. In most firms, poor performance triggers a change
in the management team. In this scenario, internal governance worsens because performance
declines, not the contrary.
While we have no “smoking gun” to assess the causal relation between internal gover-
nance and corporate performance, we can at least reduce the likelihood of reverse causation
through two additional tests. First, we look at the joint dynamics of internal governance
and corporate performance. Do changes in corporate performance happen before or after
changes in internal governance? To test this, we estimate the following two regressions:
Yit = α1 + α2 ∗ IGit−1 + α3 ∗ Yit−1 + (controls)it + εit (4)
IGit = β1 + β2 ∗ IGit−1 + β3 ∗ Yit−1 + (controls)it + εit (5)
where Yit is the firm’s corporate performance at date t (ROA or Market to book), while IG
is one of our two measures of internal governance (either FRAC1 or FRAC2). If changes
in corporate performance tend to lead changes in IG, we should not be able to reject that
β3 > 0.
Estimates of Equations (4)-(5) are reported in the Appendix (Table A-II). All regressions
include the same control variables as in Equation (3). Columns 1 and 3 report the estimates
of α2 and α3 of Equation (4), while columns 2 and 4 report the estimates of β2 and β3 from
(5). The results suggest that changes in internal governance tend to happen before changes
in corporate performance as estimates of β3 are never significantly different from zero, while
estimates of α2 always are.
Another endogeneity concern, which is not ruled out by our time-series evidence is the
following: executives might tend to leave companies when they anticipate poor performance
(for example because they want to avoid the danger of getting fired), while the CEO stays on
board to steer the ship through bad times. If executives have private information on future
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performance, internal governance would worsen before performance declines. This would
mechanically happen because “independent” executive would be replace by new ones which
would de facto be less senior than the CEO. One justification for such anticipation effects
is that executives can observe the CEO’s ability, or changes in product-market conditions,
before they materialize in corporate accounts. As a consequence, FRAC1 and FRAC2 might
be simply proxying for executives turnover, which would itself be a predictor of performance
decline.
We thus add to Equation (3) the fraction of executives that left the firm in the previous
year as a control. This turnover control is constructed as the fraction of the firm’s year
t − 1 executives who are no longer reported as working for the company at year t in the
EXECUCOMP data. A limitation of this measure is that executives can drop out of our
sample either because they are no longer employees of the company, or because they do
not belong any more to the most paid employees of the company. EXECUCOMP does not
allow us to measure executive departures more accurately. Controlling for such measure
of executive turnover means that we compel the estimation to not reflect the most recent
changes in the executive suite.
We present the new estimation results in Table VI, using the same controls as in Equation
(3). As it turns out, executive turnover indeed has a significant negative impact on firm
performance, confirming the idea that unexpectedly high executive turnover is an early
sign of bad performance. Nevertheless, adding this control does not affect – actually slightly
increases – the magnitude and significance of the impact of our internal governance measures
on performance (either measured as ROA or Market to book). Overall, our results point
toward a causal link going on from poor Internal Governance (high values of FRAC1 and
FRAC2) to bad performance.
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3.3 THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY
In our companion paper (Landier et al., 2009), we provide a model where independent
subordinates can improve the quality of decisions made at the top of the hierarchy. A
testable prediction of this model is that organizational dissent is more effective when the firm
faces uncertain product market conditions. As suggested by a large literature in sociology
of organizations (see our theory paper for references), turbulent product markets, either
because of demand instability or competitive pressure, are particular circumstances where it
is important to make “objective” choices (as opposed to choices driven by private benefits or
biases). And in our model, independent subordinates improve the likelihood of an “objective”
decision being taken, since they force the CEO to give in less to her bias. In other words,
dissenting organization are more reactive to new information.
To test this complementarity between uncertainty and executives’ independence, we check
if our measure of bottom-up governance has a stronger impact on performance, when mea-
sured uncertainty is higher. We implement this test in Table VII: following the asset pricing
literature, we measure uncertainty through the dispersion of analysts’ earnings EPS fore-
casts, normalized by the stock price. We define a dummy equal to 1 if this dispersion is
above median. We then regress our corporate performance measures on our proxies FRAC1
and FRAC2, interacted with the uncertainty dummy. In Panel A, we measure performance
through ROA; in panel B, we use Market to book. In both panels, the specifications in
columns 1 and 2 use FRAC1: looking at these columns, we find that performance is indeed
more strongly correlated with internal governance when forecast dispersion is higher. This
suggests that in more uncertain environments, independent subordinates tend to be a partic-
ularly important factor of performance. In columns 3 and 4, we use our second performance
proxy FRAC2. There, results are insignificant, but point in the same direction.
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4. Internal Governance and Acquisitions
To test whether internal governance increases the quality of CEOs decision-making by con-
straining their choices, a natural place to look is the firm’s acquisition policy. There is a
long-lasting debate among financial economists as to whether long-run acquisition returns
are positive or negative for the acquiring firm. Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that the
returns to long-run investors in acquiring firms are on average negative, in particular when
the deal is financed with stock issues. Mitchell and Stafford (1999), among others, criticize
their estimates, partly because post-acquisition returns tend not to be independent events,
as acquisitions generally cluster around stock market booms. The main problem this lit-
erature has been dealing with, is that there is considerable heterogeneity among types of
acquisitions and their performance. Thus, researchers lose substantial information on their
entire distribution by focusing on average returns and average profitability. In an attempt
to reduce this heterogeneity, some recent papers have outlined the size of acquisitions as a
key factor for success or failure (Moeller et al., 2005; Bradley and Sundaram, 2006). The
evidence they present is consistent with small acquisitions being value-creating, and large
ones being value-destroying. Following up on these papers, we look at the effect of internal
governance on shareholder losses (gains) in large acquisitions.
But before looking this issue, we first investigate the relation between internal governance
and acquisition policy. In non-reported regressions, we find that firms with good internal
governance do not make fewer acquisitions and that their acquisitions do not correspond to
smaller purchases. We follow Gompers et al. (2003), and use SDC to compute, for each
firm-year of our EXECUCOMP data: (1) the number of deals of more than $10 million in
value and (2) the overall amount of all deals struck within the year (the sum of all transaction
values if there are several deals), normalized by the acquirer’s market capitalisation. None
of these measures of acquisition intensity prove to be correlated with either FRAC1 or
FRAC2. Moreover, we find that FRAC1 and FRAC2 are not correlated with the number
of past acquisitions, which means that selecting firms with poor internal governance does
20
not select “serial acquirers”. Finally, we find that FRAC1 and FRAC2 are not correlated
with method of payment of the deal – i.e. whether the deal is financed by cash or by stock.
We then turn to the impact of internal governance on acquisition quality. As mentioned
above, we focus on large acquisitions (whose value exceeds $300 million). To measure the
performance of acquisitions, we follow Loughran and Vijh (1997) and focus on the acquirer’s
long term abnormal stock returns, which we compute using a four factor pricing model (the
Fama and French (1996) three factors plus momentum) estimated at the firm level in the 48
months preceding the acquisition. We restrict ourselves to the 1993-2009 period, in order to
be able to use EXECUCOMP information.
We then compute the average cumulative abnormal returns, starting 12 months before
the deal up to 48 months after the deal. We winsorize cumulative abnormal returns at the 1%
and 99% levels. Then, we split the sample of transactions into two parts: deals of acquirers
with FRAC1 (respectively FRAC2) above the median – i.e., poor internal governance –,
and deals of acquirers with FRAC1 (respectively FRAC2) below the median – i.e., good
internal governance – in the year preceding the acquisition. Each part comprises around 400
deals when internal governance is FRAC1 and around 500 deals when internal governance
is FRAC2. Columns 1 and 2 (respectively columns 4 and 5) of Table VIII report, separately
for good and poor internal governance acquirers constructed from FRAC1 (respectively
FRAC2), the average cumulative abnormal returns, starting 12 months before the deal up
to 48 months after the deal. Column 3 (respectively column 6) reports the difference in
cumulative returns for FRAC1 (respectively FRAC2), and tests for the equality of average
returns using a standard t-test, without assuming equal variances. Figure 2 plots cumulative
abnormal returns for each month, separately for poor (left panel) and good (right panel)
internal governance acquirers. Internal governance is FRAC1 in Figure 2(a) and FRAC2
in Figure 2(b).
We find that firms with poor internal governance make largely underperforming acquisi-
tions. When internal governance is measured by FRAC1, four years after the acquisition,
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firms with good internal governance have on average lost some 16% of shareholder value,
which is significantly different from zero. However, firms with poor internal governance have
lost around 45%, which is both significantly different from zero and from the wealth lost by
shareholders of firms with good internal governance. This difference is robust to (1) the way
we split the sample, on condition that each contains enough observations in each category
(good/poor governance) and (2) to the pricing model (results are almost similar when we
omit the momentum factor or if we simply use the CAPM). When internal governance is
measured by FRAC2, the results are similar, although weaker in magnitude. Four years after
the acquisition, firms with good internal governance have on average lost 15% of shareholder
value against 32% for firms with poor internal governance.
One might be concerned that the difference in the cumulative abnormal returns between
acquirers with poor and good internal governance is driven by an omitted variable bias.
To partly address this point, we move to a multivariate analysis and regress cumulative
abnormal returns at different time horizons on CEO/Executives characteristics, firm level
controls and deal characteristics. We estimate the following cross sectional regressions:
CARit = α+ β ∗ IGit0−1 + (IG controls)it0 + (Firm controls)it0 + (Deal controls)it0 + εit
(6)
where CARit are cumulative abnormal returns at t = 0, 6, 12, 18, 24, 30, 36, 42 and 48 months
after the deal has been announced. IGit0−1 is FRAC1 or FRAC2 of acquirer i, in the year
before the acquisition. As for Equation (3), we include CEO/executives characteristics, firm
age, firm size, the number of business segments and cash-flow volatility as control variables.
We also include two deal characteristics as additional controls, namely the logarithm of the
deal value and a dummy which equals 1 if the deal has been financed only by cash. Finally,
we include year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer and
year levels. This ensures that the results are not driven by overweighting some few acquirers
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making more than one deal over the sample period.
Table IX presents the results of Equation (6) when internal governance is FRAC1 and
Table X presents the results when internal governance is FRAC2. Consistent with the results
in Table VIII, the coefficients on either FRAC1 or FRAC2 are negative, significant (from
6 months after the deal for FRAC1 and from 12 months for FRAC2) and increase over
time (in absolute terms). Four years after the acquisition, a one-standard deviation increase
in FRAC1 is associated with a decrease in post-acquisition cumulative abnormal returns of
about 21 percentage points (84.20 ∗ 0.245). Consistent with the results in Table VIII, the
economic magnitude of the results is smaller for FRAC2: four years after the acquisition,
a one-standard increase in FRAC2 is associated with a decrease in cumulative abnormal
returns of about 14 percentage points.
5. External Versus Internal Governance
We have shown that our two measures of “internal governance” are significant predictors
of (1) overall corporate performance and (2) the efficiency of some crucial strategy choices
(acquisitions). However, one possible story consistent with such evidence is that we are
proxying for corporate governance in the “traditional” sense: firms with weak shareholders,
weak boards and powerful CEOs could also be the ones where the CEO has all the power to
appoint faithful executives. Hence, a well-entrenched CEO is more likely to replace executives
who do not show sufficient loyalty, which makes our measures of internal governance rise. At
the same time, weak boards do not have the means to oppose large, wasteful acquisitions.
This alternative story puts external governance back to the fore: when “external” gover-
nance is poor, the firm performs less well, and most executives have had less time on the job
than the CEO. If this were true, however, the existing literature on “external governance”
should also find a positive statistical relation between corporate performance and measures
of governance quality. Existing contributions have however repeatedly failed to find a posi-
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tive correlation between the share of outsiders in the board and profitability (see Hermalin
and Weisbach (2003) for a survey). Using corporate charter-based governance measures,
Gompers et al. (2003) do not find a consistent correlation between investor-friendly firm-
level institutions and operating performance. Thus, the available evidence casts doubts on
internal governance being just a proxy for external governance in our regressions.
To look at this directly, we correlate our measures of internal governance with some
measures of “external governance” that are used in the literature: More precisely, we regress
our internal governance indexes on (1) the Gompers et al. (2003) index of governance, which
takes large values for management-friendly corporate charters, (2) a dummy variable equal
to 1 when the CEO is also the chairman of the board, which measures the CEO’s degree
of power on the board (see, for example, Adam et al., 2004), (3) the size of the board (as
Yermack (1996) shows that firms with large boards are less efficient), (4) the fraction of board
members who are currently employed by the firm, and (5) the fraction of board members who
are former employees. Variable (1) is available for a subset of our main sample (the largest
firms). Variable (2) is available for our whole sample (being extracted from EXECUCOMP).
Variables (3) and (4) are extracted from IRRC’s boards and directors database and so are
available only for a subsample of our main dataset.
Table XI presents the results. Overall, the evidence is not consistent with internal gov-
ernance being a proxy of external governance. Neither FRAC1 nor FRAC2 are correlated
with the charter-based GIM index (columns 1 and 4). FRAC1 is significantly higher when
the CEO is chairman (column 2), suggesting that CEOs who are powerful inside the firm
are also powerful in the boardroom. However, this relation does not hold when internal
governance is measured with FRAC2 (the coefficient is reversed but not significant). The
only significant relation holding for both FRAC1 and FRAC2 is more surprising: internal
governance turns out to be better when there are more employees sitting on the board of
directors. One possible interpretation is that monitoring by non-executive directors (exter-
nal governance) or monitoring by subordinates (bottom-up governance) are to some extent
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substitute.
Table XI suggests there might be some weak correlation between internal and external
governance. We thus provide new estimates of Equation (3) in Table XII including external
governance measures as further controls. We also include the control variables used in
Gompers et al. (2003) that are not in our other regressions, namely Delaware incorporation
and a S&P500 dummy. Panel A focuses on ROA as a measure of performance, whereas
Panel B looks at the effects on Market to book. In both panels, Columns 1 include the GIM
index only, and firm-level controls. Columns 2 and 3 add FRAC1, whereas columns 4 and
5 add FRAC2. Columns 3 and 5 include the other external governance indexes. Consistent
with Gompers et al. (2003), the GIM index is negatively and significantly correlated with
Market to book, but not with operating performance. But the size and significance of the
coefficients on FRAC1 and FRAC2 remains similar to those in Tables III and IV once we
include the GIM index.
The inclusion of the other external governance indexes shows that (1) most of them are not
really correlated with corporate performance, which is consistent with the existing literature,
(2) the share of inside directors is positively correlated with performance (consistent with
Kaplan and Minton, 1994) and (3) the effect of FRAC1 or FRAC2 remains unaffected by
the inclusion of these controls when performance is measured with ROA, even though they
considerably reduce the sample size.
To conclude our analysis, we also check that our results on post M&A long-run per-
formance continue to hold when controlling for external governance: we re-estimate the
specifications of Tables IX and X including the GIM index as a control, and report the re-
sults in Table XIII: Panel A uses FRAC1 as the measure of internal governance, and Panel
B uses FRAC2. To save space, we do not report the coefficients of the basic controls of
Tables IX and X, even though they are included in the estimation. Because the GIM index
is not available for the entire sample, we lose about 20% of observations. Nonetheless, the
estimates of internal governance coefficients and their statistical significance are unaffected
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by the external governance control. The GIM index has no predictive power on its own.
6. Conclusion
This paper shows that independence of top executives from the CEO has an impact on
corporate performance. We measure independence by looking at whether an executive was
appointed during or before the current CEO’s tenure. Our rationale is that independently-
minded executives impose more constraints on the CEO than executives who owe him their
jobs. These constraints may prevent inefficient decisions from being taken, and have in
general the useful effect of de-biasing the CEO’s strategic choices. To play this positive role
on the quality of CEO decisions, top executives need not disobey, or enter in open conflict
with their boss: knowing that the firm’s key executives might be less enthusiastic in their
work when they disapprove decisions, the CEO has incentives to take their opinion into
account.
The insight that the independence of the executive suite from the CEO affects the quality
of corporate decisions has two normative implications for practitioners of corporate gover-
nance and organization behavior. First, the intensity of internal governance as we define it
can be easily observed and could be included in the various indexes of the quality of a firm’s
corporate governance. This implication does not depend on our interpretation of our results:
be it the sign of executives “leaving the sinking boat”, of an autocratic CEOs, or of the
healthy discipline of having to convince one’s subordinates, the share of independent execu-
tives as we measure it predicts performance. A second implication hinges on our “bottom-up
governance” interpretation: in addition to management monitoring and advising, a key role
of the board should also consist in designing the optimal balance of power within the firm.
Put otherwise, the human resource role of the board should not be limited to the usually
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Table I. Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics on our measures of executive dependence and CEO, executives and
firm characteristics. The sample consists of 23,670 firm-years in the period from 1992 to 2009 for which we
are able to construct at least one measure of executive dependence. FRAC1 is the fraction of executives
hired after the CEO constructed with the JOINED CO EXECUCOMP variable. FRAC2 is the fraction
of executives hired after the CEO constructed through entry and exit in the EXECUCOMP database.
Executives turnover measures the fraction of the firms executives who are no longer reported as working for
the company the following year in the EXECUCOMP database. Firm size is the logarithm of the book value
of assets (COMPUSTAT item AT). Firm age is the logarithm of one plus the number of years since the firm
has been in the COMPUSTAT database. Return on assets (ROA) is operating income after depreciation
and amortization (item OIBDP minus item DP) divided by total assets in the current year. Market to book
is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is the
book value of assets plus the market value of common stock (item CSHO item PRCC F) minus the sum
of the book value of common stock (item CEQ) and balance sheet deferred taxes (item TXDB). ROA and
Market to book are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels. The number of business segments is obtained from
the COMPUSTAT segment files. Cash-flow volatility is defined as in Zhang (2006). ROA and Market to
book are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels.
Distribution
Obs Mean SD 10th 50th 90th
Fraction of executives hired after the CEO
FRAC 1 (using JOINED CO) (%) 14,907 26.5 24.5 0 20 60
FRAC 2 (using entry/exit in EXECUCOMP) (%) 16,219 60.6 35.8 0 66.6 100
CEO characteristics
CEO seniority 23,670 5.574 6.347 0 4 13
CEO from outside {0, 1} 22,550 0.327 0.469 0 0 1
Executives characteristics
Executives mean seniority (using JOINED CO) 14,907 6.831 8.786 0 3.5 19
Executives mean seniority (entry in EXECUCOMP) 16,219 3.345 2.083 1 3 6.2
Executives whose seniority is reported (%) 14,907 40.7 24.9 16.6 33.3 80
Executives turnover (%) 23,670 13,1 16,3 0 0 33.3
Firm characteristics
Firm size (Log of assets $ Million) 23,371 7.444 1.831 5.222 7.302 9.898
Firm age (Log) 23,371 2.965 0.787 1.946 2.996 3.912
ROA (%) 22,306 8.62 8.72 0.30 8.43 18.97
Market to book 20,151 1.930 1.257 0.985 1.490 3.464
Nb of business segments 22,259 2.227 1.789 1 1 5
Cash-flow volatility 19,920 0.081 0.165 0.018 0.049 0.146
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Table II. Internal Governance and CEO/Executives Characteristics
Internal governance is regressed on CEO and executives characteristics. Internal governance is FRAC1 in
columns (1) to (3), and FRAC2 in columns (4) to (6). CEO characteristics are CEO seniority and whether
the CEO is an outsider. Executives characteristics are the mean seniority of executives and the number of
executives appointed in the first year following the CEO nomination. When internal governance is FRAC1,
we add the fraction of executives whose seniority is reported. In columns (2), (3), (5) and (6), we include
firm age, firm size, the number of business segments and cash-flow volatility as controls. Standard errors,
presented in parenthesis, are clustered at the firm level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ means statistically different from zero
at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance. The sample period is from 1992 to 2009.
Fraction of executives appointed after the CEO (×100)
FRAC1 FRAC2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO seniority 1.116∗∗∗ 1.115∗∗∗ 1.273∗∗∗ 9.323∗∗∗ 9.308∗∗∗ 9.145∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.055) (0.079) (0.104) (0.112) (0.150)
CEO from outside 1.591∗∗∗ 1.349∗∗ 1.473 0.787 0.669 0.508
(0.578) (0.616) (1.014) (0.437) (0.481) (0.833)
Executives’ mean seniority -0.842∗∗∗ -0.832∗∗∗ -0.589∗∗∗ -7.606∗∗∗ -7.739∗∗∗ -8.334∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.034) (0.044) (0.162) (0.175) (0.192)
Fraction of executives appointed 0.442∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗
in the year foll. the CEO nomination (0.019) (0.021) (0.028) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
(×100)
Fraction of executives whose 0.514∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ - - -
seniority is reported (0.019) (0.020) (0.022)
(×100)
Firm age - -1.470∗∗∗ -9.923∗∗∗ - 0.813∗∗ -0.241
(0.457) (1.828) (0.376) (1.981)
Firm size - 0.206 -0.386 - 0.114 0.473
(0.194) (0.555) (0.155) (0.569)
Nb of business segments - 0.020 -0.017 - -0.093 -0.130
(0.139) (0.171) (0.112) (0.183)
Cash-flow volatility - 0.458 -3.126 - 0.159 -1.142
(0.918) (2.491) (0.913) (2.364)
Industry fixed effects No Yes No No Yes No
Firm fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.68 0.68 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.92
Observations 14,117 11,752 11,772 15,758 13,478 13,485
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Table III. Performance and Internal Governance - ROA
ROA is regressed on internal governance and control variables. Internal governance is FRAC1 in columns
(1) and (2), and FRAC2 in columns (3) and (4). Columns (1) and (3) include industry and year fixed effects.
Columns (2) and (4) include firm and year fixed effects. ROA is trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels. Standard
errors, presented in parenthesis, are clustered at the firm level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ means statistically different
from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance. The coefficients are multiplied by 100 for expositional
convenience. The sample period is from 1992 to 2009.
ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FRAC 1 (lagged 1 year) -3.283∗∗∗ -1.135 - -
(0.881) (0.839)
FRAC 2 (lagged 1 year) - - -1.488∗∗∗ -0.896∗∗∗
(0.356) (0.344)
CEO seniority 0.121∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.026) (0.047) (0.040)
CEO from outside -0.093 -0.278 -0.386 -0.251
(0.371) (0.503) (0.310) (0.363)
Executives’ mean seniority 0.049∗∗∗ 0.024 0.335∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.073) (0.066)
Fraction of executives appointed -1.308 -1.334 0.741∗ -0.053
in the year foll. CEO nomination (1.295) (1.332) (0.448) (0.421)
Fraction of executives whose 0.066 -1.116 - -
seniority is reported (0.869) (0.896) - -
Firm age -0.286 -4.039∗∗∗ -0.007 -1.628
(0.292) (1.246) (0.269) (1.072)
Firm size 0.811∗∗∗ 0.100 0.765∗∗∗ -0.025
(0.161) (0.411) (0.133) (0.346)
Number of business segments -0.411∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗ -0.150∗∗ -0.135∗
(0.091) (0.094) (0.071) (0.076)
Cash-flow volatility -11.01∗∗∗ -2.922 -8.418∗∗∗ -3.850∗∗∗
(2.391) (2.051) (2.280) (1.401)
Industry fixed effects Yes No Yes No
Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.15 0.65 0.14 0.63
Observations 9,838 9,855 11,715 11,720
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Table IV. Performance and Internal Governance - Market to Book
Market to book is regressed on internal governance and control variables. Internal governance is FRAC1 in
columns (1) and (2), and FRAC2 in columns (3) and (4). Columns (1) and (3) include industry and year
fixed effects. Columns (2) and (4) include firm and year fixed effects. Market to book is trimmed at the 1%
and 99% levels. Standard errors, presented in parenthesis, are clustered at the firm level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ means
statistically different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance. The coefficients are multiplied by
100 for expositional convenience. The sample period is from 1992 to 2009.
MARKET TO BOOK
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FRAC 1 (lagged 1 year) -17.84 -2.503 - -
(12.71) (10.95)
FRAC 2 (lagged 1 year) - - -11.36∗∗ -8.708∗∗
(4.83) (4.141)
CEO seniority 0.591 1.007∗∗ 1.745∗∗∗ 1.106∗∗
(0.441) (0.423) (0.622) (0.547)
CEO from outside 6.657 6.043 -0.086 1.256
(5.575) (7.046) (4.259) (4.789)
Executives’ mean seniority 0.854∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗ 2.820∗∗∗ 3.731∗∗∗
(0.288) (0.286) (1.028) (0.976)
Fraction of executives appointed -0.345 -13.28 8.769 4.798
in the year foll. CEO nomination (20.05) (20.68) (6.589) (6.155)
Fraction of executives whose 6.182 -6.776 - -
seniority is reported (12.33) (12.31)
Firm age -19.79∗∗∗ -91.50∗∗∗ -12.71∗∗∗ -41.25∗∗∗
(4.655) (17.67) (3.990) (14.21)
Firm size -1.132 -33.29∗∗∗ -2.541 -36.45∗∗∗
(2.469) (5.103) (1.832) (4.972)
Number of business segments -5.760∗∗∗ -2.013 -2.713∗∗∗ -1.187
(1.507) (1.456) (1.032) (1.072)
Cash-flow volatility -5.558 21.22 1.797 9.361
(9.128) (34.32) (8.209) (13.30)
Industry fixed effects Yes No Yes No
Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.22 0.70 0.22 0.70
Observations 9,098 9,116 10,831 10,836
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Table V. Performance and Internal Governance - Robustness
This table presents coefficients on internal governance from variants of the regressions in Table III and Table
IV. Internal governance (lagged one year) is FRAC1 in panel A and FRAC2 in panel B. In columns (1) and
(2), the control variables (not reported for brevity) are the same as in Table III, column (1). In columns
(3) and (4), the control variables are the same as in Table III, column (3). In rows (1) and (4), we proxy
firm age by taking the logarithm of the number of years since the firm has been in the CRSP database,
instead of the COMPUSTAT database. In rows (2) and (5), we replace the number of business segments by
a diversification dummy as control. The diversification dummy equals one if the firm reports more than one
business segment. Rows (3) and (6) include the square of all control variables as additional controls. In rows
(7) and (8), we use alternative measures of performance as dependent variable, namely Net margin – defined
as net income (item NI) over sales (item SALE) – and return on equity (ROE) – defined as net income over
common stock (item CEQ). For regressions with ROE, observations for which common stock is negative are
excluded. ROA, Market to book, Net margin and ROE are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels. Standard
errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the firm level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ means statistically different
from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance. The coefficients are multiplied by 100 for expositional
convenience. The sample period is from 1992 to 2009.
Panel A: FRAC 1 Panel B: FRAC 2
Industry Fixed Firm Fixed Industry Fixed Firm Fixed
Effects Effects Effects Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: ROA
(1) Firm age CRSP -3.231∗∗∗ -0.946 -1.489∗∗∗ -0.855∗∗
(0.881) (0.839) (0.356) (0.345)
(2) Diversification -3.316∗∗∗ -1.145 -1.504∗∗∗ -0.907∗∗∗
dummy (0.882) (0.838) (0.356) (0.345)
(3) The square of -3.002∗∗∗ -1.331 -1.534∗∗∗ -1.015∗∗∗
control variables (0.860) (0.832) (0.348) (0.345)
Dependent variable: MARKET TO BOOK
(4) Firm age CRSP -14.59 1.791 -10.48∗∗ -7.643∗
(12.71) (10.90) (4.810) (4.164)
(5) Diversification -18.42 -2.551 -11.99∗∗ -8.925∗∗
dummy (12.72) (10.93) (4.817) (4.157)
(6) The square of -18.35 -1.410 -12.80∗∗∗ -9.149∗∗
control variables (12.54) (10.79) (4.838) (4.162)
Dependent variable: Alternative performance measures
(7) Net margin -4.058∗∗∗ -1.649 -2.206∗∗∗ -1.307∗
(1.433) (1.694) (0.627) (0.697)
(8) ROE -2.929 -0.467 -3.812∗∗∗ -2.933∗∗
(1.920) (2.426) (1.042) (1.232)
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Table VI. Performance and Internal Governance - Controlling for Executives Turnover
Measures of performance is regressed on internal governance, executives turnover and control variables.
Performance is measured through ROA in Panel A and through Market to book in Panel B. Executives
turnover at year t− 1 measures the fraction of the firm’s year t− 1 executives who are no longer reported as
working for the company at year t in the EXECUCOMP data. In regressions (1) and (2) of Panel A and B,
the control variables (not reported for brevity) are the same as in Table III, column (1). In regressions (3)
and (4) of Panel A and B, the control variables are the same as in Table III, column (3). ROA and Market
to book are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels. Standard errors, presented in parenthesis, are clustered at
the firm level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ means statistically different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance.
The coefficients are multiplied by 100 for expositional convenience. The sample period is from 1992 to 2009.
Panel A: ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FRAC 1 (lagged 1 year) -3.717∗∗∗ -1.530∗ - -
(0.879) (0.840)
FRAC 2 (lagged 1 year) - - -1.904∗∗∗ -1.174∗∗∗
(0.362) (0.353)
Executives turnover -7.829∗∗∗ -4.397∗∗∗ -4.722∗∗∗ -2.412∗∗∗
(lagged 1 year) (0.720) (0.649) (0.541) (0.458)
CEO/Executives characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes No Yes No
Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.16 0.65 0.15 0.63
Observations 9,838 9,855 11,714 11,719
Panel B: MARKET TO BOOK
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FRAC 1 (lagged 1 year) -21.67∗ -7.163 - -
(12.75) (10.99)
FRAC 2 (lagged 1 year) - - -15.66∗∗∗ -12.30∗∗∗
(4.566) (3.771)
Executives turnover -70.85∗∗∗ -47.00∗∗∗ -48.99∗∗∗ -30.83∗∗∗
(lagged 1 year) (9.827) (8.511) (6.612) (5.322)
CEO/Executives characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes No Yes No
Firm fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.22 0.70 0.23 0.70
Observations 9,098 9,116 10,830 10,835
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Table VII. Performance and Internal Governance - Interaction with Uncertainty
Measures of performance is regressed on internal governance, analysts’ earnings forecasts dispersion and
control variables. Performance is measured through ROA in Panel A and through Market to book in Panel
B. Uncertainty is a dummy which equals one for firm-year observations with analysts’ forecasts dispersion
above the median. The data on analysts’ earnings forecasts are taken from the Institutional Brokers Estimate
System (I/B/E/S). For each stock and fiscal year, we keep only the last forecast of each analyst. Dispersion
is then defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts normalized by the fiscal
year’s stock price. In regressions (1) and (2) of Panel A and B, the control variables (not reported for
brevity) are the same as in Table III, column (1). In regressions (3) and (4) of Panel A and B, the control
variables are the same as in Table III, column (3). ROA and Market to book are trimmed at the 1% and
99% levels. Standard errors, presented in parenthesis, are clustered at the firm level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ means
statistically different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance. The coefficients are multiplied by
100 for expositional convenience. The sample period is from 1992 to 2009.
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Panel A: ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FRAC 1 (lagged 1 year) -1.302 0.378 - -
(0.965) (0.976)
FRAC 1 (lagged 1 year) * Uncertainty -3.945∗∗∗ -3.863∗∗∗ - -
(1.197) (1.144)
FRAC 2 (lagged 1 year) - - -1.089∗∗ -0.814∗∗
(0.458) (0.385)
FRAC 2 (lagged 1 year)* Uncertainty - - -0.055 0.023
(0.605) (0.489)
Uncertainty -3.709∗∗∗ -1.305∗∗∗ -4.532∗∗∗ -1.993∗∗∗
(0.362) (0.312) (0.347) (0.269)
CEO/Executives characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes No Yes No
Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.22 0.67 0.21 0.66
Observations 7,204 7,204 8,886 8,886
Panel B: MARKET TO BOOK
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FRAC 1 (lagged 1 year) -1.772 17.80 - -
(18.15) (15.92)
FRAC 1 (lagged 1 year) * Uncertainty -28.93∗ -48.97∗∗∗ - -
(16.00) (15.55)
FRAC 2 (lagged 1 year) - - -10.09 -6.837
(7.297) (5.475)
FRAC 2 (lagged 1 year)* Uncertainty - - -1.144 -5.089
(7.532) (6.645)
Uncertainty -48.38∗∗∗ -16.92∗∗∗ -45.57∗∗∗ -19.00∗∗∗
(5.532) (5.081) (5.187) (4.424)
CEO/Executives characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes No Yes No
Firm fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.26 0.73 0.27 0.73
Observations 6,652 6,652 8,177 8,177
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Table VIII. Long Run Abnormal Returns Following a Major Acquisition
Abnormal returns are computed after estimating, for each acquirer, a Fama French 3 factor model + momen-
tum on the 48 months preceding the acquisition. Cumulative abnormal returns, starting 12 months before
the deal, are computed for each firm and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Internal governance is
FRAC1 in columns (1) to (3), and FRAC2 in columns (4) to (6). Column (1) and (4) report, every 6 months,
the average cumulative abnormal returns of acquirers with internal governance lower than median. Column
(2) and (5) does the same for above-median internal governance acquirers, while column (3) and (6) report
the difference. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ means statistically different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance,
using a standard test of equality, assuming away the equality of variances. T-statistics are in parenthesis.
The coefficients are multiplied by 100 for expositional convenience. The sample period is from 1992 to 2009.
Internal Governance
Months since FRAC1 FRAC 2
acquisition Poor Good Difference Poor Good Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-6 1.470 0.613 -0.858 0.284 -0.440 -0.724
(0.477) (0.544)
0 -2.760 0.055 2.816 -2.281 -2.468 -0.187
(1.314) (0.117)
+6 -10.91 0.047 10.96∗∗∗ -7.169 -3.991 3.178
(4.040) (1.520)
+12 -18.63 -3.343 15.28∗∗∗ -12.11 -6.969 5.138∗∗
(4.969) (2.058)
+18 -27.42 -5.504 21.92∗∗∗ -16.04 -7.832 8.211∗∗∗
(6.743) (2.737)
+24 -31.19 -9.686 21.51∗∗∗ -18.76 -10.09 8.677∗∗∗
(5.997) (2.594)
+30 -35.64 -12.01 23.63∗∗∗ -21.57 -11.61 9.963∗∗∗
(6.068) (2.661)
+36 -39.02 -12.05 26.97∗∗∗ -24.50 -10.00 14.50∗∗∗
(6.192) (3.413)
+42 -43.30 -13.06 30.23∗∗∗ -29.13 -12.44 16.69∗∗∗
(6.707) (3.758)









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table XI. Are Internal and External Governance Related?
Internal governance is regressed on various corporate governance indicators and control variables. Internal
governance is FRAC1 in columns (1) to (3), and FRAC2 in columns (4) to (6). Columns (1) and (4) use
the (mostly) corporate charter-based corporate governance index from Gompers et al. (2003). Columns (2)
and (5) use a dummy which equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board. Columns (3) and (6)
use Gompers et al. (2003) governance index, the chairman dummy, and add the number of directors on the
board, the share of currently employed directors and the share of past employees on the board. The control
variables (not reported for brevity) included in columns (1) to (3) are the same as in Table III, column (1).
The control variables included in columns (4) to (6) are the same as in Table III, column (3). Standard
errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the firm level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ means statistically different
from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance. The coefficients are multiplied by 100 for expositional
convenience.
FRAC 1 FRAC 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GIM governance index -0.018 - -0.199 0.031 - -0.081
(0.115) - (0.161) (0.101) - (0.124)
CEO is chairman - 1.554∗∗ 0.809 - -0.750 -1.087
(0.621) (0.809) (0.510) (0.807)
Board size (# directors) - - -0.506∗∗∗ - - 0.041
(0.186) (0.162)
Fraction directors - - -15.97∗∗∗ - - -6.822∗
who are current employees (3.741) (3.598)
Fraction ind. directors - - -0.152 - - -3.648
who are former employees (4.829) (3.526)
CEO/Executives characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.87 0.86 0.92
Observations 7,788 11,145 2,916 9,154 13,316 2,803
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Table XII. Internal Versus External Governance - Performance
Performance is regressed on measures of internal and external governance and control variables. The control
variables (not reported for brevity) in columns (1) of panel A and B are firm size, firm age, the number of
business segments and cash-flow volatility. In columns (2) and (3), the control variables are the same as in
Table III, column (1). In columns (4) and (5), the control variables are the same as in Table III, column
(3). Delaware incorporation and a S&P dummy are included as additional controls in all regressions. All
columns include industry- and year fixed effects. ROA and Market to book are trimmed at the 1% and
99% levels. Standard errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered at the firm level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ means
statistically different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance. The coefficients are multiplied by
100 for expositional convenience.
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Panel A: ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FRAC 1 (lagged 1 year) - -3.177∗∗∗ -4.135∗∗∗ - -
(0.974) (1.564)
FRAC 2 (lagged 1 year) - - - -1.517∗∗∗ -1.751∗∗
(0.397) (0.685)
GIM governance index -0.057 0.021 0.148 -0.009 0.039
(0.055) (0.076) (0.108) (0.061) (0.092)
CEO is chairman - - 0.611 - 0.315
(0.730) (0.621)
Board size (# directors) - - 0.137 - 0.142
(0.124) (0.105)
Fraction directors - - 4.811∗∗ - 3.638
who are current employees (2.431) (2.458)
Fraction ind. directors - - 4.021 - 2.653
who are former employees (3.272) (2.721)
CEO/Executives characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.20
Observations 12,391 6,800 2,565 8,050 2,408
Panel B: MARKET TO BOOK (×100)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FRAC 1 (lagged 1 year) - -19.39 -23.98 - -
(14.16) (24.11)
FRAC 2 (lagged 1 year) - - - -16.02∗∗∗ -2.827
(5.664) (10.32)
GIM governance index -2.928∗∗∗ -2.140∗ -1.643 -3.314∗∗∗ -3.997∗∗
(0.802) (1.127) (1.741) (0.941) (1.611)
CEO is chairman - - -14.76 - -9.926
(10.62) (9.078)
Board size (# directors) - - -0.168 - 0.427
(2.115) (1.749)
Fraction directors - - 60.30 - 77.82∗
who are current employees (39.03) (44.79)
Fraction ind. directors - - -8.396 - 2.914
who are former employees (49.10) (39.93)
CEO/Executives characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.26 0.27 0.34 0.27 0.37






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A-I. Performance and Internal Governance - Year by Year Results
Regressions of performance on internal governance and controls are run separately each year. Performance
is measured through ROA in the first columns of panel A and panel B, and through Market to book in the
second columns of panel A and panel B. The coefficients on FRAC1 (lagged one period) are reported in panel
A, while the coefficients on FRAC2 (lagged one period) are reported in panel B. In panel A, the control
variables are the same as in Table 3, column (1). In panel B, the control variables are the same as in Table
3, column (3). Regressions include industry-fixed effects. The bottom row indicates the Fama-Mac Beth
estimate. ROA and Market to book are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels. Standard errors are reported
in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ means statistically different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance.
The coefficients are multiplied by 100 for expositional convenience. The sample period is from 1992 to 2009.
Panel A: FRAC 1 Panel B: FRAC 2
ROA MARKET TO BOOK ROA MARKET TO BOOK
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1993 -4.282 -37.57 - -
(2.755) (41.62)
1994 -2.621 0.812 - -
(2.320) (27.96)
1995 -1.322 8.376 -1.454 -45.94∗∗
(1.946) (27.82) (1.712) (22.05)
1996 -4.367∗∗ -21.97 -5.310∗∗∗ -8.106
(1.931) (26.43) (1.609) (20.80)
1997 -2.729 -11.13 -0.017 -1.163
(1.894) (29.29) (1.407) (22.39)
1998 -4.071∗∗ -14.69 0.553 25.27
(1.865) (30.22) (1.357) (19.56)
1999 -4.109∗∗ -24.77 -1.381 -19.50
(1.845) (32.66) (1.339) (22.00)
2000 -4.875∗∗∗ -82.54∗∗∗ -1.163 -32.19
(1.863) (31.44) (1.188) (20.59)
2001 -3.528∗ 0.356 -1.274 21.71
(1.938) (29.21) (1.166) (16.52)
2002 -4.094∗∗ -44.98∗∗ -2.485∗∗ -20.10
(1.872) (21.99) (1.198) (13.68)
2003 -4.639∗∗ -53.87∗ -2.259∗ -32.29∗∗
(1.939) (28.08) (1.150) (15.80)
2004 -2.371 -24.22 -1.102 -23.98∗
(2.103) (29.01) (1.033) (14.02)
2005 -1.926 24.64 -0.935 -25.12∗
(2.379) (32.78) (0.964) (13.55)
2006 -3.440 -8.566 -2.146∗∗ -16.39
(2.536) (34.96) (0.921) (11.76)
2007 - - -1.075 -12.71
(1.017) (13.94)
2008 - - -2.102∗ -2.313
(1.193) (11.09)
2009 - - -1.794 1.714
(1.217) (12.00)
Fama-Mac Beth -3.455∗∗∗ -20.72∗∗∗ -1.596∗∗∗ −12.74∗∗
(0.291) (7.379) (0.338) (5.052)
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Table A-II. Performance and Internal Governance - Granger Causality
In panel A and B, columns (1) and (3) report the result of a regression of performance on one-year lagged
internal governance and one-year lagged performance. Columns (2) and (4) report the result of a regression of
internal governance on one-year lagged internal governance and one-year lagged performance. Performance
is measured through ROA in panel A, and through Market to book in panel B. Internal governance is FRAC1
in columns (1) and (2), and FRAC2 in columns (3) and (4). In columns (1) and (2), the control variables
(not reported for brevity) are the same as in Table 3, column (1). In columns (3) and (4), the control
variables are the same as in Table 3, column (3). Regressions include industry- and year-fixed effects. ROA
and Market to book are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels. Standard errors, reported in parenthesis, are
clustered at the firm level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ means statistically different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level of
significance. The sample period is from 1992 to 2009.
Panel A: ROA FRAC 1 ROA FRAC 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FRAC 1 (-1) -1.593∗∗∗ 50.34∗∗∗ - -
(0.503) (1.367)
FRAC 2 (-1) - - -0.638∗∗∗ 23.36∗∗∗
(0.222) (0.695)
ROA (-1) 60.26∗∗∗ 1.065 62.36∗∗∗ -1.114
(3.459) (1.019) (2.242) (1.313)
CEO/Executives characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.55 0.81 0.56 0.88
Observations 9,812 10,106 11,710 11,976
Panel B: MARKET TO BOOK FRAC 1 MARKET TO BOOK FRAC 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FRAC 1 (-1) -16.86∗ 50.02∗∗∗ - -
(9.527) (1.432)
FRAC 2 (-1) - - -5.624∗ 23.03∗∗∗
(2.978) (0.722)
Market to book (-1) 31.65∗∗∗ 0.065 52.79∗∗∗ -0.041
(6.410) (0.076) (5.221) (11.03)
CEO/Executives characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.42 0.81 0.58 0.88
Observations 8,954 9,345 10,671 11,037
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Variable Description
Panel A: Governance variables
FRAC 1 Fraction of executives hired after the CEO constructed with the
JOINED CO EXECUCOMP variable. High values mean poor in-
ternal governance.
FRAC 2 Fraction of executives hired after the CEO constructed through entry
and exit in the EXECUCOMP database. High values mean poor
internal governance.
GIM index Gompers et al. (2003) index of corporate governance, based on 24
antitakeover provisions. High values of GIM index mean poor external
governance.
CEO is chairman Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO is also chairman of the board, 0
otherwise.
Board size Number of directors sitting on the board.
Panel B: CEO/Executives characteristics
CEO seniority Number of years since the executive has been appointed as the CEO
(using BECAMECEO EXECUCOMP variable).
CEO from outside Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO has been appointed from the outside,
0 otherwise.
Executive’s seniority Number of years since the executive has been working for the company
(using the JOINED CO EXECUCOMP variable or entry in the
EXECUCOMP database).
% of executives whose % of executives for which the JOINED CO variable is non-missing.
seniority is reported
Executives turnover Fraction of executives who are no longer reported as working for the
company the following year in the EXECUCOMP database.
Panel C: Firm Characteristics
Firm age Logarithm of one plus the number of years since the firm has been in
the COMPUSTAT database.
Firm size Logarithm of book value of total assets (COMPUSTAT item AT).
ROA Operating income after depreciation and amortization (OIBDP minus
DP) divided by total assets (AT).
Market to book Market value of assets over book value of assets
(AT+(CSHO×PRCC)-CEQ-TXDB)/AT.
Cash-flow volatility Defined as in Zhang (2006) – i.e., the standard deviation of cash flows
from operations over the past five years, with a minimum of three
years.
Number of business segments Obtained from the COMPUSTAT segment files.
Panel D: Deal Characteristics
Cumulative abnormal returns Computed using a four factor model (Fama French factors + Momen-
tum), estimated over the 48 months preceding the acquisition.
All-cash deal Dummy variable: 1 if the deal has been financed only by cash, 0
otherwise (from SDC).
Deal size Logarithm of deal value (from SDC).
Figure 3. Definition of variables
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